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PENSIONS AS PROPERTY SUBJECT TO
EQUITABLE DIVISION UPON DIVORCE IN
OKLAHOMA
I. INTRODUCTION
A major topic of discussion in legal and business circles today' is
the status, upon divorce, of a pension due a working spouse on retire-
ment-whether such a pension constitutes jointly acquired property
subject to equitable division upon divorce. Part of the "new prop-
erty' 2 of marriage, the pension is conceivably the most valuable asset
of a marriage in today's "debt-happy society."3 A majority of the
states, by statute, permit their courts to make an equitable division of
certain property upon divorce.4 While most state courts have not ruled
directly on the question, several have held that "benefits payable from
a retirement plan, at least to the extent that they are vested at the time
of the divorce, are property subject to division by a divorce court."'
The trend toward considering a pension as part of the marital estate is
seen most clearly in the community property states.6 California, in
1976, overruled thirty-five years of precedent 7 when its supreme court
declared that pension rights, to the extent that they are derived from
employment during marriage, comprise a community asset subject to
division upon divorce.'
I. See BUSINESS WEEK, November 7, 1977, at 104-08.
2. C. FooTE, R. LEVY, & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 816 (2d ed.
1976) [hereinafter cited as FOOTE].
3. BUSINESS WEEK, November 7, 1977, at 104. E.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d
838, 848, 544 P.2d 561, 566, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638 (1976) in which the court stated, "As the date
of vesting and retirement approaches, the value of the pension right grows until it often represents
the most important asset of the marital community."
4. FOOTE, supra note 2, at 815.
5. Dickinson, The Divorce Situation Role of Retirement Plans, 10 REAL PROP., PROD. & TR.
J. 644 (1975). E.g., In re Marriage of Pope, 544 P.2d 639 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
6. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington.
Basically, in these states each party to the marriage has a legal claim to half of all property ac-
quired during marriage. See FOOT, supra note 2, at 749-62. See also notes 39-45 infra and
accompanying text.
7. Overruled was French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941). The decision in
French characterized nonvested pension rights not as property but as a mere expectancy and thus
not a community asset.
8. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 CaL 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). Subse-
quent to French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941) and prior to Brown, the court had
1
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The concern of this comment is the status of the working spouse's
pension upon divorce in Oklahoma. The statutory authorization for
property division upon divorce will be summarized, along with the ju-
dicial construction of the statutes.' There will be a brief comparison of
the community property, common law property, and Oklahoma prop-
erty systems to determine if the differences among them merit distinc-
tion in the treatment of pensions upon divorce. 10 More importantly,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court has addressed the issue, and the discus-
sion of those cases will form one of the major areas of concentration. 1
This comment will then examine cases from other jurisdictions to see
how those courts have handled the problem. 2 The conclusion will
present the arguments for and against treating the pension due the
working spouse as jointly acquired property subject to an equitable di-
vision upon divorce in Oklahoma. 3 It should be noted that much of
the discussion will be couched in terms of the wife as the nonworking
spouse and the husband as the recipient of the pension plan. This is the
configuration of the parties with which the courts have most frequently
been presented. The principles discussed are, of course, applicable
whichever roles the spouses assume.
II. STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION AND CONSTRUCTION
Title 12, sections 1275 and 1278 of the Oklahoma Statutes 14 au-
thorize the trial court to restore to each party, upon divorce, the prop-
erty individually owned prior to marriage and to confirm in each party
the property he or she acquired after marriage in his or her own right.
It is from such separate property that alimony, if any, will be paid.
Under these statutes property acquired by the parties jointly during
marriage is subject to a just, fair, and reasonable division between
them."' Such jointly acquired property is divided no matter which
party holds the title, and the court is instructed to have due regard to
held that a vested pension was community property. Thus, in Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530
P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975), the court ruled that an attorney could be sued for malpractice
because he did not assert in a divorce action his client's community interest in the vested retire-
ment benefits due her husband.
9. See notes 14-38 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 39-76 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 77-103 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 104-131 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 132-141 infra and accompanying text.
14. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1275 (1971) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (Supp. 1978). Note
that section 1275 allows the court to make this equitable division ofjointly acquired property even
when the court refuses to grant the parties a divorce.
15. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (Supp. 1978).
1978]
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 14 [1978], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol14/iss1/6
TULSA LAW JOURXAL [Vol. 14:168
the time and manner of acquisition of the property in making the divi-
sion.' 6 Property jointly acquired has been defined as property "accu-
mulated by the joint industry of the husband and wife during the
marriage."'" It includes the enhanced value of separate property
brought to the marriage if such enhancement is the result of "joint ef-
forts, skill or funds of both working together' 8 as well as property
obtained by combining separately acquired funds. 19 The term has
been construed to refer to "all property accumulated during marriage
except property acquired by one spouse as a gift or inheritance. 20
In defining jointly acquired property, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has not had the opportunity to discuss the level of interest which
rises to the status of "property" and thus comes under the statutory
mandate.2' Property subject to division is typically the residence of the
parties, furniture, automobiles, savings and bank accounts, life insur-
ance policies, and stocks and bonds.22 Included without discussion in
this inventory have been the proceeds from an insurance claim for fire
losses to a family business23 and a severed mineral interest in a tract of
land.24 The court has, also without discussion, excluded from the in-
16. "[T]he particular proviso respecting division of jointly acquired property when granting
divorce is not permissive, but defines a mandatory duty placed upon the trial court." Collins v.
Oklahoma Tax Comm., 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla. 1968). See generally Comment, Domestic Rela-
tions." Relevant Factors in the Division of Jointly Acquired Propey, 23 OKLA. L. Ray. 288 (1970).
17. Tobin v. Tobin, 89 Okla. 12, 213 P. 884 (1923). It is property acquired during married
life "as the result of industry, economy and business ability .... Collins v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm., 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla. 1968).
18. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla. 1968).
19. Johnston v. Johnston, 440 P.2d 694, 697 (Okla. 1968).
20. Symposium on the Law ofDomestic Relations in Oklahoma-Alimony and the Division of
Jointiy Acquired Property, 14 OKLA. L. REV. 422, 427 (1961). See also Heirs of Payne v. Seay,
478 P.2d 889 (Okla. 1970) in which the court said, "Separate property is defined . . . as that
acquired [after marriage] by gift, devise or descent, or by exchange of the spouse's individual
property." Id at 896.
21. See In re Marriage of Ellis, 538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. App. 1975) for an opinion which re-
fused to recognize that military retired pay is "property" since it "is not a fixed or tangible asset.
At no time has it any cash surrender, loan, redemption, or lump sum value... .[It] cannot be
attached or garnished .... The right to the pension ... cannot be assigned, sold, transferred,
conveyed, or pledged." Id at 1349. See also French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235
(1941) in which a pension was considered to be a mere expectancy.
22. See Attleberry v. Atfleberry, 554 P.2d 1370 (Okla. 1976).
23. See Kiddie v. Kiddie, 563 P.2d 139 (Okla. 1977).
24. See Coker v. Coker, 460 P.2d 424 (Okla. 1969). Whereas several courts which have
addressed the issue of whether a pension is jointly acquired property placed emphasis on the
status of a pension as a property interest, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decisions did not con-
sider that point. See notes 77-103 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this point and
of other interests which the court has, with discussion, included or excluded from the inventory of
jointly acquired property.
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ventory of jointly acquired property the value of a growing wheat
crop. 25
The court has recognized that there may not be "participation...
in the business world" 26 on the part of both parties to the marriage.
Thus, the industry required of the nonworking spouse has been defined
as "performance of. . .customary duties during coverture" 27 and
"participation. . .[in] domestic activities. 28 If such industry has con-
tributed to the accumulation of property during the marriage, the non-
working spouse is entitled to certain rights in that property.
A spouse's rights in jointly acquired property become important
upon divorce.2 9 At that time the spouse is entitled to a share of such
property; the spouse "has a vested interest therein which is not forfeited
even though [he or] she may be at fault."3 It is not required by the
statutes, which mandate only a fair and just division, that each partner
receive an equal share of the jointly acquired property, and, indeed, the
court has emphasized this point.3 In making the division, the trial
court will look to the facts and circumstances of each case. The court
will consider the parties' respective conduct and efforts which contrib-
uted to the acquisition of the property, without regard for the needs of
the parties or their personal conduct except as such conduct relates to
the creation of the estate.32
25. See Maxfield v. Maxfield, 258 P.2d 915 (Okla. 1953).
26. Durfee v. Durfee, 465 P.2d 161 (Okla. 1970): "[A] wife's entitlement to such a division [of
jointly acquired property] does not necessarily derive from any participation by her in the business
world, as distinguished from domestic activities." Id at 165.
27. Catron v. First Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 434 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1967): "[T]he performance of a
wife's customary duties during coverture is sufficient to entitle her to the benefits provided by
[Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1278]." Id at 276.
28. Durfee v. Durfee, 465 P.2d 161, 165 (Okla. 1970).
29. See note 58 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the contingent nature of a
spouse's rights in jointly acquired property in Oklahoma. See also Jones v. Farris, 180 Okla. 341,
69 P.2d 344 (1937).
30. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla. 1968).
31. "[T]he 'equitable division' referred to in 12 O.S. 1961, § 1275 [sic], does not necessarily
mean an 'equal division'." Durfee v. Durfee, 465 P.2d at 165. E.g., Tobin v. Tobin, 89 Okla. 12,
213 P. 884 (1923): "There may be circumstances surrounding the accumulation of the property
under which, when the unfortunate hour of the divorce is reached, it would be grossly inequitable
to divide the property equally between the parties. For this reason, the language of the statute
uses the words 'fair and equitable division'." Id at 17, 213 P. at 889.
32. Hill v. Hill, 197 Okla. 697, 699, 174 P.2d 232, 234 (1946). See also Greer v. Greer, 194
Okla. 181, 183, 148 P.2d 156, 158 (1944). In Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla 94, 22 P.2d 1012 (1933)
a divorce was granted to the wife due to the husband's fault. The court, in its syllabus, pointed
out several relevant considerations in making a property division: whose efforts principally re-
sulted in the accumulation of the jointly acquired property; duration of married life; whether the
marriage was one of convenience or one of love and affection; whether the wife was somewhat at
fault and provoked ill treatment; the respective financial worth of the parties; and their respective
conduct as to frugality or wastefulness during the married life.
4
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It is necessary to distinguish this division of jointly acquired prop-
erty from an award of alimony. While a property division is mandated
by the statute,33 the granting of alimony is discretionary. 34  "[I]n di-
vorce proceedings, alimony and division of property jointly acquired
are separate and distinct questions, and are governed by separate and
distinct statutory provisions. 35 Confusion sometimes arises due to the
fact that the statutes allow division of jointly acquired property either
"in kind" or by an award of the entire property to one spouse who then
pays the other spouse a "sum as may be just and proper to effect a fair
and just division thereof."36 The trial courts have added to this confu-
sion by language such as "judgment for alimony 'as property division
and in settlement of all her property right. . . .' " Since the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the pension being paid to a
retired spouse may be considered only as earnings in determining ali-
mony for support, 38 it is important to remember the distinction be-
tween alimony and a division of jointly acquired property.
33. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
34. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1275 (1971) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (Supp. 1978). See
also Reed v. Reed, 456 P.2d 529 (Okla. 1969).
35. Kunc v. Kunc, 86 Okla. 297, 299, 97 P.2d 771, 774 (1940). See notes 77-83 infra and
accompanying text. The distinction is also important for purposes of title 12, section 1289 of the
Oklahoma Statutes which allows termination of alimony payments upon the death of the recipient
but provides that payments arising from a division of jointly acquired property are irrevocable
and shall continue until completed. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289 (Supp. 1978). The U.S. Internal
Revenue Service also treats the two payments differently. See I.R.C. §§62(13), 71(d), 215.
36. The sum paid to the other spouse has been misconstrued as alimony. See Bowring v.
Bowring, 196 Okla. 520, 166 P.2d 415 (1946).
37. Colvert v. Colvert, 568 P.2d 623, 625 (Okla. 1977). In this case the wife received a di-
vorce because of the fault of her husband, a soon-to-be graduated medical student. She was
awarded "an alimony judgment, as property division, of $35,000, payable in monthly install-
ments." 568 P.2d at 624. The husband appealed since the value of their jointly acquired prop-
erty did not remotely approach that amount. He claimed his wife had been given a property
interest in his soon-to-be received medical degree. The court denied that this was the case and
said that the trial judge had considered the husband's future earning capacity in setting the
amount of the judgment. Since the Oklahoma Supreme Court has said that the only relevant
consideration in making a division of jointly acquired property is the conduct and efforts of the
parties which contributed toward the accumulation of that property, see text accompanying note
32 supra, its upholding of the trial court's award in this case is strange. It may be explained by
looking to the language of OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289 (Supp. 1978) and by pointing out that an
award to the wife of alimony, while discretionary, is paid out of the husband's separate property.
A court can consider the future earnings of the husband in setting an alimony award, see
Whayman v. Whayman, 207 Okla. 371, 249 P.2d 1004 (1952), and, by authority of title 12, section
1289, can earmark the award as being for support or for property division, as it wishes. Apparently
the trial court looked to the future earnings of the husband, as evidenced by his medical degree,
and considered them the husband's separate property. Out of this the wife was awarded alimony
which was designated as a property settlement. It is no wonder the husband was confused, This
consideration of the husband's future earnings plays a role in the court's analysis of the status of a
pension on divorce. See notes 77-103 infra and accompanying text.
38. Baker v. Baker, 546 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1976). See notes 77-83 infra and accompanying
text.
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III. COMPARISON OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, COMMON LAW
PROPERTY, AND OKLAHOMA PROPERTY SYSTEMS
A. The Community Properly System
The community property system originated in Europe and was
brought to America by the Spanish colonists. This system has long
recognized "that both men and women share equally in the labor and
struggles of daily life. Accordingly, it was thought appropriate that
men and women should also share equally in the fruits of their com-
mon efforts, and a notion of community of goods between husband and
wife developed." 9
The first step in discussing the community property concept is to
identify community property, as distinguished from separate property.
It is only community property in which each spouse has half owner-
ship. "Property acquired by the earnings of either husband or wife
during marriage, income from community property, and property ac-
quired by the sale of community property"'  is community property.
The only requirement for sharing in this community property is that
there be a marriage.4 1 It is then presumed that the husband and wife
have worked side by side in acquiring property during the marriage.42
39. FooTE, supra note 2, at 755. The community property system, a creature of statute, varies
widely in America from state to state. For a brief treatment of community property concepts, see
J. CRIBBEr, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 91-93 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as CRIB-
BET]. For a complete treatment, see W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as DE FuNIAK].
40. CRIBBET, supra note 39, at 92. "On the other hand, property owned by either spouse
before marriage, acquired by gift, inheritance, or devise after marriage, and income from such
property is considered to be separate and subject to control by the spouse concerned." Id DE
FUNIAK, supra note 39, at 126-29, points out that courts tend, without adequate analysis, to hold
that any property acquired during marriage is community property, as long as it was not acquired
by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance. This overlooks the distinction, always present in commu-
nity property law, between property acquired by onerous title and property acquired by lucrative
title. Property acquired by onerous title is that "property acquired by husband and wife during
the marriage through their labor or industry or other valuable consideration out of community
property (i.e. payment of money, rendition of services, or payment of charges). Property acquired
by onerous title is always community property. Property acquired by lucrative title is exemplified
by a gift, an inheritance and a devise and has its basis in pure donation (versus remuneration) on
the part of the donor. Whether it is community property depends on whether the donor intends
the property to be for the benefit of both spouses. It was because of this distinction that some
early cases held that the military retirement pension was not community property as it was purely
a gift to the soldier from the federal government and thus acquired by lucrative title. See John-
son v. Johnson, 23 S.W. 1022 (rex. Ct. App. 1893).
41. DE FUNIAK, supra note 39, at 93. See id, at 276-83, for a discussion of the management
of community property.
42. This presumption that property possessed or acquired during the marriage or in posses-
sion of the spouses at the time of the dissolution of the marriage is community property is, of
course, rebuttable. DE FUNIAK, supra note 39, at 117-18. The presumption is also the starting
point for an analysis of the status of income derived during the marriage from separate property
19781
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At the moment of acquisition, each spouse has ownership rights in half
of the property.43
Just as marriage creates community property, dissolution of the
marriage destroys it. This dissolution may result from death or di-
vorce, and upon such dissolution each spouse is theoretically, and, in-
deed in several states, is absolutely entitled to his or her separate estate
plus half of the community property.' This is not true, however,
under the statutes of several community property states. These states
allow their courts "to take into consideration the respective situations
of the spouses, as well as the situation of the children, and also [allow]
the courts to consider the respective innocence and guilt of the spouses
in deciding how to divide the community property. '4-
The community property system has wrestled with the problem of
the type of interest which rises to the level of "property." Indeed, the
characterization by the California Supreme Court of the right to retire-
ment pay in the future as a "mere expectancy" has only recently been
abandoned in favor of calling such right a "contingent interest in prop-
erty."'  The importance of this distinction is that the former is not a
community asset subject to division upon dissolution of marriage,
while the latter is. The court's analysis in In re Marriage of Brown4 7 is
instructive, not only on the general problem of what interests constitute
"property," but also on the status of pensions upon divorce under com-
munity property law.
Brown involved a pension plan contributed to only by the em-
ployer under which the husband-employee, were he to be prematurely
discharged, would forfeit all rights in the fund.48  Thus his rights had
and of assets purchased during the marriage in part with separate property and in part with com-
munity property. See FooTE, supra note 2, at 759.
43. "In simpler words, the rights of each spouse in the community property are vested."
Lilly, Oklahoma'r Troublesome Coverture Property Concept, 11 TULSA L.J. 1, 3 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Lilly]. See also DE FuNiAK, supra note 39, at 142:
It is important to notice that the wife's ownership and possession in half of these
earnings and gains [through labor and industry of the spouses] during marriage passed to
her automatically Osojure without the necessity of delivery. And her ownership and
possession in half of these earnings and gains... related, just as the husband's owner-
ship did, to the very inception of the right to such earnings and gains.
44. FooTE, supra note 2, at 759. See also DE FUNIAK, supra note 39, at 515.
45. DE FuirNLx, supra note 39, at 514.
46. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). See
also DE FuNIAK, supra note 39, at 129-97, for a complete discussion of the status of various
interests under community property law.
47. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
48. If he accumulated the required points, his rights in the fund would not be forfeited even
if he were discharged. 15 Cal. 3d at 843, 544 P.2d at 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635. The details of the
pension plans involved (i.e. whether contributed to only by the employee, only by the employer, or
[Vol. 14:168
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not vested. These rights were comparable to those of a husband in an
earlier case of which the court had said: "To the extent that payment is,
at the time of the divorce, subject to conditions [i.e. continued employ-
ment] which may or may not occur, the pension is an expectancy, not
subject to division as community property."'49 The court in Brown,
however, relied on prior pension case law to reaffirm that an employee
has an enforceable right to a pension from the moment he enters his
employment contract, provided that he fulfills the required condi-
tions.5 0  Because a pension is a form of deferred compensation for
services rendered, the employee's right to his pension is based on his
employment contract. A contract right is not an expectancy but a
chose in action, a form of property.51 The fact that the payment of the
pension is contingent upon the employee's fulfilling certain conditions
merely makes the pension a contingent future interest, long recognized
as property, and thus a community asset. 2
B. The Oklahoma Property System
Oklahoma is now considered to be a common law property state.
However, the state was briefly involved with the community property
system 53 and today retains the coverture property concept, a feature
by both; whether subject to forfeiture by death or discharge; whether refundable or nonrefundable
on voluntary termination of employment) assume great importance in the opinions of most courts.
See notes 104-131 infra and accompanying text. Confusion can occur because each court has its
own definitions of key terms. The California Supreme Court used "expectancy" to describe the
interest of a person who merely foresees that he might receive a future beneficence but who has no
enforceable right to the beneficience. "Vested" was used to refer to a pension right which sur-
vives the discharge or voluntary termination of the employee.
As so defined, a vested pension right must be distinguished from a 'matured' or
unconditional right to immediate payment. Depending upon the provisions of the re-
tirement program, an employee's right may vest after a term of service even though it
does not mature until he reaches retirement age and elects to retire. Such vested but
immature rights are frequently subject to the condition, among others, that the employee
survive until retirement.
15 Cal. 3d at 843, 544 P.2d at 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
49. 15 Cal. 3d at 845, 544 P.2d at 564, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
50. The conditions are usually length of employment and survival until retirement. If the
employer is a public entity, the contract's enforceability is based on the constitutional prohibition
against impairment of contracts. A contract can be enforced against a private employer under the
traditional contract principles of offer, acceptance and consideration or on the basis of promissory
estoppel. 15 Cal. 3d at 847, 544 P.2d at 566, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
51. 15 Cal. 3d at 846, 544 P.2d at 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
52. Again reliance was placed on prior case law which had found other contingent future
interests, such as an attorney's contingent fee in a case on appeal, to be community assets. 15 Cal.
3d at 848, 544 P.2d at 566, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
53. In 1939 the Oklahoma legislature allowed married couples to elect voluntarily to come
under the community property system. In 1945 the system was made mandatory in the state and
remained so until repealed in 1949.
8
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born out of that system. Coverture property is that discussed
above-jointly acquired property subject to just and reasonable divi-
sion upon divorce."4 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has declared that
property acquired during coverture is "an estate in the manner of com-
munity property.""
The Oklahoma property system recognizes, by its coverture prop-
erty concept, that joint industry goes into the acquisition of property
during marriage. The Oklahoma Supreme Court defined the wife's
interest in this coverture property when it said: "The nature of the
wife's interest is similar in conception to community property of com-
munity property states, and is regarded as held by a species of common
ownership. ' 56  This court also set out the distinction between
Oklahoma and the community property states that the wife, during the
marriage, lacks "actual investiture of title, a right to make present dis-
position of property, [and] a descendible interest. 57 In Oklahoma, the
right to assert an interest in jointly acquired property is available to the
wife only on specific occasions. It is said that her rights are contingent;
they do not vest until divorce, separation, inability to support, or death
occur.5 8 Thus the same court which could say that a "wife has a vested
interest in jointly acquired property of the marital community"5 9 also
had to acknowledge that the wife had no right to a division of jointly
acquired property prior to divorce. Until then, her interest in the
property is merely contingent.'
C. The Common Law Property System
In contrast to the community property approach of half to the hus-
band and half to the wife is the common law property concept. The
common law property system developed in England and was brought
to America by the English colonists. This system was based on the idea
that "the husband and wife [were] one and the husband [was] the
one." 6 1 Although it has no modem significance, the estate jure uxoris
was the embodiment of the concept of the unity of husband and wife.
54. See notes 15-20 supra and accompanying text. Coverture property is also subject to divi-
sion upon separation or death. See Sanditen v. Sanditen, 496 P.2d 365, 367 (Okla. 1972).
55. Black v. Haynes, 45 Okla. 363, 145 P. 362 (1914).
56. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla. 1968).
57. Id at 297.
58. Lilly, supra note 43, at 5. See also Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm,, 446 P.2d 290, 296
(Okla. 1968).
59. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 446 P.2d 290, 297 (Okla. 1968).
60. Id at 296.
61. CRwBET, supra note 39, at 86.
[Vol. 14:168
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This estate gave the husband the right, for the duration of the marriage,
to any real property owned by the wife.62 The husband's rights in his
wife's real property included power to manage it, to sell or to mortgage
his interest in it, and to make it liable for his debts.63 The wife could
not alienate the property without her husband's permission.64  The
husband was also entitled to "[w]hatever movables the wife [had] at the
date of the marriage. and he [was] entitled to take possession and
make his own any movables to which [the wife became] entitled during
the marriage." 6
The right to dower was the wife's protection of her interest in her
husband's property. Upon the death of the husband or upon divorce
for any reason except the fault of the wife, dower gave the wife a life
estate in one-third of the real property owned by the husband at any
time during the marriage. This interest attached immediately upon ac-
quisition of the property. Even if subsequently conveyed to a third
person, the dower interest was unaffected unless the wife either joined
in the conveyance or the parties were divorced due to the fault of the
wife.66 Thus at common law the wife was entitled, upon divorce, to
the restoration of her separate property and, unless divorced through
her own fault, to a life estate in one-third of her husband's real prop-
erty.
With the passage of the Married Woman's Property Acts,67 the
legal unity of husband and wife was severed. Today, however, the
common law jurisdictions for the most part still do not recognize the
"defacto community of property which prevails in most marriages. 68
During the marriage each spouse has a legal claim only to that property
he or she separately owns, except for assets held in some form of joint
ownership. In most states, upon divorce, there is no attempt to divide
rationally the jointly acquired property.69 In some states neither the
statutes nor the courts differentiate clearly between property divisions
62. Id at 86. Note that if "issue were born of the marriage, the estate jure uxoris merged
into [the husband's] estate by curtesy." Id This gave the husband a life estate in all real property
owned by his wife.
63. Id
64. DE FuNIAi, supra note 39, at 5.
65. Id at 4.
66. CRIBBET, supra note 39, at 87-88.
67. These acts typically provided that property brought into the marriage by the wife as well
as property acquired by the wife during the marriage was to be regarded as the wife's separate
estate, subject to her control and power of disposition. FooTE, supra note 2, at 756. Eg., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-9 (West 1978).
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and alimony for support.7 °
At common law a wife's dower interest attached only to "lands
and tenements whereof [her husband] was seised at any time during the
coverture."'7 Obviously, such an inheritable interest in real property is
of sufficient status to be termed "property" and to be subject to division
upon divorce. Examples of the analysis modem courts in common law
jurisdictions use to decide whether a certain interest rises to the status
of "property" will be discussed later.72
As has been noted, there are distinctions among the property sys-
tems in the community property states, in the common law property
states, and in Oklahoma. These distinctions, though major in some
areas, should not call for differing answers to the question of whether a
pension due the working spouse is jointly acquired property. However,
because of their recognition of the husband and wife as a community,
the community property states are probably more willing to recognize
the joint effort attributable to the acquisition of a pension.73  This ap-
plies, however, only after their courts have analyzed the right to a pen-
sion and found it to be property. Because of a philosophy of the unity
of husband and wife, with the husband's being the unit, common law
property states were more likely to consider a pension as either the per-
sonal property of the spouse who earned it74 or as future income in
setting the amount of alimony payable to the wife .7  However, this
situation is changing. Common law property states have been faced
increasingly with the issue of pensions as a marital asset.76 The resolu-
tion often turns on whether the right to a pension is recognized as prop-
erty.
IV. THE OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT FACES THE ISSUE
In 1975 in Baker v. Baker,7 7 the Oklahoma Supreme Court was
70. Id at 815. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 307 Alternative A (1973 amend-
ment) is identified by its drafters as a new concept in Anglo-American law. It is based on the
principle that "all property of the spouses, however acquired, should be regarded as assets of the
married couple, available for distribution among them, upon consideration of... various factors
enumerated ... " Alternative B, drafted at the behest of the community property states, retains
the distinction between separate and community property and provides for the distribution of only
community property.
71. CRIBBET, sUpra note 39, at 87.
72. See notes 104-131 infra and accompanying text.
73. E.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 848, 544 P.2d 561,566, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633,
638 (1976).
74. E.g., Howard v. Howard, 196 Neb. 351, 242 N.W.2d 884 (1976).
75. E.g., In re Marriage of Ellis, 538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
76. E.g., Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361, 248 N.W.2d 272 (1976).
77. 546 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1976).
[Vol. 14:168
11
Smith: Pensions as Property Subject to Equitable Division upon Divorce i
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
PENSIONS AS PROPERTY
faced directly with the issue of whether a trial court had erred in treat-
ing a military service pension as jointly acquired property subject to
division upon divorce. The court reversed the trial court and held that
pension benefits could be considered only as earnings in determining
the amount of alimony for support, not as marital property subject to
division.78
Baker involved a pension 79 which was already being paid to the
husband at the rate of $812.85 per month. Finding this pension to be
jointly acquired property, the trial judge awarded the wife the sum of
$24,000, payable in installments, as a division of this property. 0 The
husband contended on appeal that "retirement pay is not property ac-
quired by the parties during coverture."'
The court agreed, stating that "if the retirement fund is divided at
the time of the divorce as jointly acquired property [it] would in effect
destroy the husband's future livelihood and means of complying with
an alimony or support award." 2 The court allowed the pension to be
considered as earnings out of which alimony for support could be
paid.83
In making its decision the court cited an earlier case, Holeman v.
Holeman. That case involved a pension plan to which the husband,
twenty-nine months away from his retirement date, was still contribut-
ing at the time of the divorce. There was no evidence introduced of
the husband's rights in the pension plan: whether he would lose all fu-
ture benefits if he resigned or was dismissed prior to retirement;
whether, in such case, he would be reimbursed for either fhis contribu-
tions or for his employer's contributions, if any; and whether he had a
right of withdrawal of any of the accumulated funds prior to retire-
ment." The trial court awarded the wife $16,000 alimony, payable in
78. Id at 1326.
79. Apparently most of this military pension had been earned during the marriage of the
parties. They had been married over seventeen years, and the husband was a second lieutenant at
the time of the marriage. He retired prior to the divorce action. Id
80. The trial court also awarded the wife property totaling $27,625 in value (versus $6,050 to
the husband) and alimony for support of $18,000. Id
81. Id
82. Id
83. The supreme court, taking the pension into consideration, modified the wife's award for
alimony for support from $18,000 to $24,000, payments of which would terminate on death or
remarriage. Id at 1327.
84. 459 P.2d 611 (Okla. 1969).
85. This is the type of evidence which has been very important to other courts considering the
issue. See notes 104-131 infra and accompanying text. Evidence was introduced that showed that
the value of the retirement fund ten years prior to trial was $2,375. The trial court did find that
the husband would receive $260 per month upon retirement. The wife's contention that the fund
1978]
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 14 [1978], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol14/iss1/6
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
installments of $200 per month prior to the husband's retirement and in
installments of $90 per month thereafter.
On appeal the husband contended that the property division which
gave the wife their entire 135 acre farm was inequitable. His wife
pointed out that the "the decree [gave the husband] his retirement fund,
which is also jointly acquired property. ' 86 The court noted that the
husband had been allowed to keep his retirement fund but reminded
the wife that out of it he had to pay $90 per month alimony. The court
said, "It would be unfair to divide the retirement fund and then make a
provision for payment of the majority of the alimony award out of his
monthly retirement income."87
An interesting aspect of this case is that it fails to state that a retire-
ment fund is not jointly acquired property. In fact, the court seems to
agree that it is by using such language as "[w]ith the exception of the
retirement fund the only asset the parties have acquired. . . is the 135
acre farm."8 The approach of both the Baker and Holeman courts is
that it is not fair to divide the retirement fund and then to make the
husband pay alimony for support out of his portion. Since alimony for
support is discretionary,89 it is not clear that the same result would have
been reached had there been no award for alimony to the wife.
Prior to Baker and Holeman, the court, in Whayman v.
Whayman,90 examined an appeal from a judgment in which the hus-
band's retirement fund had played a part. The pension plan involved
was one to which the husband had been contributing through payroll
deductions for many years. Upon his mandatory retirement in five
years, he would have been entitled to payments totalling approximately
$15,000.91 The trial court awarded the wife alimony of $10,200, paya-
ble at the rate of $125 per month for five years and $75 per month
thereafter. Obviously the trial judge considered the retirement pay-
ments as future income and set the alimony payments to decrease ac-
cordingly; the supreme court upheld him. The issue of whether the
retirement fund was jointly acquired property was neither raised by the
parties nor addressed by the court.
Although not dealing specifically with the pension due the work-
was worth $37,752 at the time of trial was found to be unsupported by the evidence. 459 P.2d at
613.
86. Id
87. Id at 614.
88. Id
89. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (Supp. 1978).
90. 207 Okla. 371, 249 P.2d 1004 (1952).
91. 207 Okla. at 372, 249 P.2d at 1006.
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ing spouse, Roberts v. Roberts92 concerns an analogous situation. In
that case, the husband had been contributing ten percent of his salary
per month, an amount matched by his employer, to "the Provident
Fund. . . . He may not withdraw this unless he leaves his present
employer or retires." 93 The trial judge had awarded this fund, in all
important respects identical to a pension fund, wholly to the husband. 94
There was no award of alimony to the wife. In listing the assets ac-
quired by the spouses during their marriage, the supreme court in-
cluded the $30,000 value of the Provident Fund and found that the wife
had been awarded only "ten to twenty percent of an accumulation of
property of some $45,000 to $50,000 in value." 95 Finding this to be
contrary to section 1278,96 which requires a just and reasonable divi-
sion of jointly acquired property, the court set the property division
aside.97
The court was then faced with the problem of dividing the Provi-
dent Fund, the money in which could not be withdrawn unless the hus-
band left his present employment or retired.98 Recognizing that the
husband could not be required to do this, the court instead awarded the
wife "an allowance [of $12,100] payable monthly as alimony in lieu of
a division of this fund."99
To summarize, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has ruled that a
pension presently being paid to a husband is not jointly acquired prop-
erty subject to division upon divorce."co It has ruled that a pension
plan could be considered in determining alimony, either as present
earnings t '0 or as future income102 However, in a closely analogous
92. 357 P.2d 980 (Okla. 1960).
93. Id at 981. "In addition, his employer maintains a separate retirement program for all
employees, including [Mr. Roberts]." Id This separate retirement program apparently played
no part in either the decision of the trial court or of the supreme court.
94. It is difficult to tell from the reported decision whether the trial court awarded the fund to
the husband as a part of his portion of the jointly acquired property or whether the judge consid-
ered it the husband's separate property and restored it to him. If it was considered jointly ac-
quired property, the wife received as her share of property $5,033 to $9,833 out of a total of
$46,000 to $52,000. If it was considered separate property, the wife received $5,033 to $9,833 out
of a total of $16,030 to $22,000. 357 P.2d at 982. Even though either award is arguably inequita-
ble in a divorce granted to both parties, the former award is even more so and leads to the conclu-
sion that the trial judge considered the Provident Fund to be the husband's separate property.
95. Id at 982-83.
96. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (Supp. 1978).
97. 357 P.2d at 982-83.
98. One of the major problems in considering a pension as jointly acquired property is how
to make a division of it upon divorce. See note 141 infra and accompanying text.
99. 357 P.2d at 983.
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situation, the court found a nonpension fund to which both the hus-
band and his employer contributed and to which the husband would be
entitled upon leaving employment or retiring, to be jointly acquired
property. Unable to make division in kind, the court, looking to the
instructions of section 1278, gave the fund to the husband and required
him to pay to his wife "such sum as may be just and proper to effect a
fair and just division thereof."'' 03 The supreme court has not, like the
California Supreme Court in Brown, discussed the level of interest a
working spouse has in the pension due him-whether it is merely an
expectancy or whether it rises to a contingent future interest. The
court's decisions seem to turn entirely on what it identifies as the equi-
ties involved. If there is an alimony award to the wife, the pension paid
to or due the husband has not been considered as jointly acquired
property because the husband must have it to meet his alimony obliga-
tions. In Roberts, there was no alimony award to the wife, and the
Provident Fund was considered jointly acquired property. Note that
the court has yet to face directly the issue of whether, in the absence of
an alimony award, a pension not being paid but due to the working
spouse is jointly acquired property subject to division upon divorce.
V. COURTS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS FACE THE ISSUE
In contrast to the Oklahoma courts, the courts of other common
law jurisdictions, in considering pension plans as a marital asset, use an
analysis much like that of the California Supreme Court in Brown.
The courts look at the features of the pension plan and decide whether
such features tend to make the working spouse's interest in the plan
property.14
In 1976, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the military retire-
ment pay being received by the husband was not property under the
applicable statute. "Our reason is that it does not have any of the fol-
lowing elements: cash surrender value; loan value; redemption value;
lump sum value; and value realizable after death."' 0 In making this
102. Holeman v. Holeman, 459 P.2d 611 (Okla. 1969). See also Whayman v. Whayman, 207
Okla. 371, 249 P.2d 1004 (1952).
103. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (Supp. 1978).
104. The term "vested" plays a large role in the decisions of many of the courts. Each court
has its own definition of the term. For the most part, in discussing the cases, the use of the term
will be avoided here. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 uses the term
"vested benefit" to mean that portion of the employee's total benefits (which he will receive upon
retirement) which is nonforfeitable except on death. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(25) (1976).
105. Ellis v. Ellis, 552 P.2d 506, 507 (Colo. 1976). The court was construing COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-113 (Supp.1976) which requires that the court shall divide "the marital property."
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decision the court upheld the intermediate appellate court and relied
on that court's reasoning.
In that intermediate proceeding,10 6 the appellate court considered
a divorce where the husband was then drawing his retirement pay from
the military. The trial court had allowed this pay to be considered in
setting the award of maintenance and support. The wife argued that
the retirement pay was marital property, a division of which she was
entitled to. On appeal the court noted several aspects of the military
pension program: the program was noncontributory on the part of the
soldier; his right to the pay was contingent on his living until retirement
age; and the amount of retirement pay-wholly within the control of
Congress-was subject to change.1"7 Looking primarily to the factors
on which the supreme court was later to rely,'08 the court found that
"the husband's army retirement pension and the future retired pay to
be received thereunder do not constitute 'property' and are, therefore,
not subject to division as such."'' 0 9
Later in the same year, however, in In re Marriage of Pope, 0 the
Colorado Court of Appeals was faced with the problem of the status,
upon divorce, of the contributions of the working spouse on deposit
with the Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association."' This
pension fund was made up of contributions from state employees. In
the event of termination of employment before retirement, the full
amount of the employee's contributions was refunded. If the em-
ployee died prior to retirement, the accumulated deductions were paid
in a lump sum to his heirs. In contrast to the situation in Ellis, there
The statute defines marital property-basically the definition of community property-and pro-
vides a presumption that all property acquired subsequent to marriage is marital property.
106. In re Marriage of Ellis, 538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975). This decision was cited and
relied on by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Fenney v. Fenney, 259 Ark. 858, 537 S.W.2d 367
(1976). The applicable statute in Arkansas granted to the wife upon divorce one-third of her
husband's personal property. The court held that the right to receive retirement pay from the
armed forces was not "personal property" within the meaning of the statute because such right to
payment, not yet due and payable, could not be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed or pledged.
Id
107. 538 P.2d at 1349. The court also pointed out that the retirement pay had no cash surren-
der value and no loan, redemption, or lump sum value; it could not be attached or garnished; and
the right to the pay not yet due and payable could not be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed or
pledged. Id
108. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
109. 538 P.2d at 1350. Having no cash surrender value, the pension was treated as property
which might later be acquired by the husband. Previous case law had settled that after-acquired
property was not subject to a property division. Id
110. In re Marriage of Pope, 544 P.2d 639 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
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was a cash surrender value which the court could consider-the
amount of the employee's accumulated contributions. 1 2 All these fac-
tors were sufficient to distinguish Pope from Ellis, and the court held
the interest of the husband in the pension due him to be property. Un-
able to divide the husband's interest in the pension fund in kind, the
court considered the amount of the fund in determining the amount of
other marital property to be retained by each spouse.1 3 The court also
adopted one of the principal policy arguments for treating a pension as
jointly owned property subject to division upon divorce. "The hus-
band's interest in these funds was created out of deductions from his
salary which otherwise would have been available to the parties during
their marriage." '114
The Missouri Supreme Court has also split on this issue." 5  In
Robbins v. Robbins'16 the wife appealed from a ruling that she was not
entitled to have the present value of the pension to which her husband
would be entitled upon retirement considered in determining her
award of alimony. Her contention was that she should receive gross
alimony based on the net assets of the parties, and she claimed half of
the present value of her husband's future pension benefits. The hus-
band, a policeman, had contributed a portion of his salary to a retire-
ment fund to which the employer also contributed. If the husband
resigned prior to retirement, he would receive a refund of only his con-
tributions. No provision was made for his dependents except on his
disability or death. "[Tihe right to a pension or to a return of contribu-
tions [was] not subject to levy, attachment or execution and [was] not
assignable.""' Considering all this, the court held that "a valuation of
defendant's rights as the present value of his possible future pension
benefits would be purely speculative"' 18 and affirmed the trial court's
refusal to consider the interest a present asset of the husband. The
112. 544 P.2d at 640.
113. Id at 641. This is analogous to the direction of the Oklahoma statute which allows
marital property to be set aside to one spouse who reimburses the other spouse for his or her
interest in the property. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (Supp. 1978).
114. 544 P.2d at 640.
115. In Jaeger v. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App. 1977), the court remanded a divorce ac-
tion to give the parties an opportunity to present evidence concerning the nature of the pension
plan involved and the husband's rights in it. Such evidence was then to be considered in the light
of In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App. 1975) (husband's interest in pension fund
considered to be marital property) and Robbins v. Robbins, 463 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1971) (hus-
band's interest in pension plan considered too contingent to be considered in making an award of
maintenance to the wife).
116. 463 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1971).
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wife argued that because her husband's rights in the pension fund were
vested she was entitled to a share upon divorce. The court agreed that
the husband had a right to his future benefits which could be taken
from him only if he did not comply with the requirements of the plan.
But the court held that he had never had any right to the present value
of the future pension.119
In In re Marriage of Powers2 ° the husband relied on Robbins in
arguing that his interest in his company's profit sharing plan was im-
properly included as marital property subject to division upon divorce.
He contended that his interest in the plan was not definite enough to be
property. The court distinguished Robbins by pointing out that Mr.
Powers could not use the funds in the account until he terminated his
employment or retired; however, he would receive both his contribu-
tions and his employer's contributions if he did resign prior to retire-
ment. 121  This served to make his interest a present asset-and thus
marital property subject to division-whereas Mr. Robbins, who would
receive only his own contributions upon resignation, had no present
asset.
Of the common law jurisdictions, New Jersey has been one of the
most progressive in examining the "new property" of marriage and giv-
ing it the status of property subject to division upon divorce. 122  Its
courts have analyzed husbands' interests in several pension plans and
have come to different conclusions.123
119. Id at 881.
120. 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). In this case the court was construing Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 452.330 (Vernon 1977) which calls for division of the marital property upon divorce on
the basis of certain specified considerations. The statute is very similar to the Colorado statute
involved in Ellis and Pope. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1976). See also note 105 supra.
121. Powers v. Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949, 957 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
122. See Callahan v. Callahan, 142 NJ. Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561 (1976) in which the court
held that the value of stock options to which a husband was entitled was property subject to an
equitable division upon divorce. The applicable statute is NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West
Supp. 1977) which calls for the court "to effectuate an equitable distribution of the property, both
real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by [the parties] or either of them
during the marriage." Id
123. See White v. White, 136 NJ. Super. 512, 347 A.2d 360 (1975). But see Pellegrino v.
Pellegrino, 134 N.J. Super. 512, 342 A.2d 226 (1975). Another court which has made this analysis
in a number of cases is the Wisconsin Supreme Court in construing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.26
(West Supp. 1977) which allows the trial court to divide either party's estate, real or personal,
between the parties. In Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, 67 Wis. 2d 176, 226 N.W.2d 518 (1975) (pension
fund should be included among assets for division between the parties), the court reviewed its past
decisions on the subject of the status of pensions upon divorce. The Michigan Court of Appeals
took the opportunity in Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361, -, 248 N.W.2d 272, 273 (1976)
"to resolve this question which has been plaguing the trial courts"--whether the trial judge should
consider the retirement pension of the husband as an award in the division of property. In an-
swering the question in the affirmative, the court reviewed case law from Washington, Texas,
Colorado, Wisconsin, and New Jersey.
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In Pellegrino v. Pellegrino12 4 the wife contended that her hus-
band's contributions to his retirement plan were subject to an equitable
distribution upon divorce. Under the plan his contributions would be
repaid to him or paid to his chosen beneficiary should he resign or die
before retirement. The husband's interest was thus characterized as "a
present fixed right to future enjoyment"1 21 of his contributions, and as
such his contributions were subject to division upon divorce.
Pellegrino was distinguished in While v. White,126 where the hus-
band had an interest in a pension plan contributed to only by his em-
ployer. He had no right of withdrawal of the contributions until he
became totally and permanently disabled, resigned (after reaching a
certain age and working a required number of years), or retired. The
court refused to characterize this interest, stating that, whatever present
right the husband had in the plan, it was neither property acquired
during marriage nor subject to equitable division upon divorce.' 27
The issue in Kruger v. Kruger'28 involved the same question the
Oklahoma Supreme Court faced in Baker:129  the status upon divorce
of military retirement pay already being received by the husband.
Reaching the opposite conclusion from that of the Oklahoma court,
this court looked to precedent from the community property states to
characterize military retirement pay, not as a gratuity, but as considera-
tion earned by the employee.' 30  As such it was property subject to
division, and to effect the division the husband was ordered to pay the
124. 134 N.J. Super. 512, 342 A.2d 226 (1975).
125. 134 NJ. Super. at--, 342 A.2d at 227-28. The Pellegrino decision was explained in Blitt
v. Blitt, 139 NJ. Super. 213, 353 A.2d 144 (1976). There the court said that the source of the
contributions-whether from employee, employer or both-was not the deciding factor. What
was important was that the contributions were payable to the employee should he resign or die
prior to retirement. In Blitt the contributions would be repaid even if the employee were dis-
missed.
126. 136 N.J. Super. 552, 347 A.2d 360 (1975).
127. 136 NJ. Spper. at -, 347 A.2d at 361.
128. 139 N.J. Super. 413, 354 A.2d 340 (1976).
129. 546 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1976). See notes 77-83 supra and accompanying text. The dissent-
ing judge in Kruger raises some good arguments for those who support the view of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court. This issue was also faced in In re Marriage of Ellis, 538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1975). See notes 105-108 supra and accompanying text. The Nebraska Supreme Court in
Howard v. Howard, 196 Neb. 351, -, 242 N.W.2d 884, 888 (1976) decided the same issue in
accord with the Oklahoma court. Its decision cited no authority and merely declared:
A pension of one party to a marriage, unless its terms provide otherwise, is not ajoint fund for the benefit of the other party and is not ordinarily subject to division as
part of a property settlement .... There are situations where retirement income must be
considered in providing for the care and maintenance of the divorced wife. In those
situations, it is considered as a source for the payment of alimony, not as a part of a
property settlement.
130. 139 N.J. Super. at -, 354 A.2d at 344.
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wife a specified amount from each retirement payment he received. It
should be noted that the wife received no award of alimony as did the
wife in Baker.
From this discussion it can be seen that the status of the pension
due the working spouse is dependent in most common law jurisdictions
on the type of interest the spouse has in the plan. Courts engage in a
case by case analysis of the plans, the most important aspect of which
seems to be the provision specifying what the employee-spouse would
receive should he or she terminate employment or die prior to retire-
ment. Some common law jurisdictions differ in their respective treat-
ments of a future pension due the employee and of a pension presently
being paid to the retired employee. 131
VI. POLICY ARGUMENTS
There are several arguments which can be made for considering
the pension due the working spouse as jointly acquired property subject
to division upon divorce. One of these arguments characterizes the
pension fund, made up of contributions in the form of payroll deduc-
tions or contributions by the employer which otherwise would have
been payable as salary, as deferred compensation. As a Michigan
court stated, this compensation "would have been available to the par-
ties during their marriage to be invested in stocks, bonds, savings ac-
count, annuity and/or other investments." '132 This deferred
compensation could have been used during the marriage, not only to
augment the marital estate but also to raise the parties' standard of
living.133
In some cases the husband and wife have an understanding, per-
haps unspoken, that the pension due the working spouse will be used
for both of them. 34 In such cases, in the event that no alimony is
131. Indeed, the New Jersey court said that its decision in Pellegrino v. Pellegrino, 134 N.J.
Super. 512, 342 A.2d 226 (1975) (funds contributed by husband to pension plan subject to equita-
ble distribution upon divorce) did not involve the same issue as was faced in Kruger v. Kruger,
139 N.J. Super. 413, 354 A.2d 340 (1976) (husband's military retirement pay constituted assets
subject to equitable distribution). Even though the decisions were the same as to the status of the
pensions involved, Pellegrino was not dispositive of the result in Kruger. 139 N.J. Super. at -,
354 A.2d at 343. See also notes 128-130 supra and accompanying text. See Hutchins v. Hutch-
ins, 71 Mich. App. 361, 248 N.W.2d 272 (1976) (retired husband's pension payments subject to
equitable distribution upon divorce).
132. Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361,-, 248 N.W.2d 272, 277 (1976). All these are
more usual forms of jointly acquired property subject to division upon divorce.
133. See Scherzer v. Schemer, 136 NJ. Super. 397, -, 346 A.2d 434, 437 (1975).
134. See Robbins v. Robbins, 463 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Mo. 1971) in which the wife testified
"that, since her employers had no pension plan, it was the understanding of both that [the hus-
band's] pension would be used for their mutual security and retirement."
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awarded, to allow the working spouse to retain his or her pension inter-
est, without an off-setting payment to the other spouse, is inequitable.
This is especially true where there is little other jointly acquired prop-
erty to be divided.
In Oklahoma an award of alimony for support is discretionary
with the trial judge. 3 5 If a pension may be considered only in deter-
mining this award and there is no award of alimony for support, the
spouse with the pension may end up with a secure future while the
other spouse gets nothing. t3 6
In the case where there is an award of alimony for support, the
pension does enter into the judge's consideration; however, it must be
remembered that certain contingencies, such as remarriage, terminate
the support payments. 37  On the other hand, a spouse who remarries
would normally continue to receive a share of pension benefits divided
as jointly acquired property since payments pertaining to a division of
property are irrevocable. 138
Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Commission raises another aspect of the
alimony-joint property division issue. "If property has been acquired
by joint effort during marriage the wife has a vested interest therein
which is not forfeited even though she may be at fault."'' 3 9 It is un-
likely that alimony would be awarded to a wife at fault. If her hus-
band's pension plan is not considered jointly acquired property, she
will forfeit her share of the plan, no matter how much effort and indus-
try she contributed to the marriage.
There are several disadvantages to the nonworking spouse to hav-
ing a pension due the working spouse included in a property division
rather than considered as income in determining alimony for support.
If the payments are treated as income, the entire pension account is
available for alimony purposes; if the pension is divided as property,
only the amount accumulated in the account during the marriage is
subject to division. Moreover, alimony payments are enforceable by
135. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (Supp. 1978).
136. See.In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d, 838, 849, 544 P.2d 561, 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633,
639 (1976) in which the court answered the husband who insisted that an award of alimony would
compensate his wife for not receiving a share of his pension benefits. "Alimony, however, lies
within the discretion of the trial court; the spouse 'should not be dependent on the discretion of the
court.. . to provide her with the equivalent of what should be hers as a matter of absolute
right.'
137. See Oa.A. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289 (Supp. 1978).
138. Id
139. 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla. 1968).
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contempt proceedings and will not be discharged by bankruptcy. 40
Courts are understandably reluctant to characterize pensions as
property subject to an equitable division.'' If they do, they must de-
termine how the pension is to be divided. Most courts whose decisions
were examined in this article did not direct an actual apportionment of
the specific pension fund. Instead, the value of the fund was taken into
account in determining the total assets available for equitable division.
The employee-spouse then retained the entire fund but made an off-
setting payment to the other spouse. Other courts, since the present
value of a pension to be received in the future is sometimes difficult to
ascertain, will order the retired employee-spouse to pay the other a por-
tion of each pension payment as it is received.
VII. CONCLUSION
It remains to be seen what the Oklahoma Supreme Court will do
when directly faced with the issue of whether the pension due the
working spouse is jointly acquired property subject to just and reason-
able division upon divorce. The opinion of the California Supreme
Court in In re Marriage of Brown could be persuasive, due to the affin-
ity between the concepts of community property and coverture prop-
erty. Too, the court may be influenced by other common law
jurisdictions, and their case by case analyses of the pension interest in-
volved. As alimony is awarded less often and the pension interest-is
increasingly included in the assets of married couples, it is obvious that
the Oklahoma Supreme Court should rethink its position that a pen-
sion can only be considered as income in determining alimony for sup-
port.
Dianne Smith
140. See Neugebauer v. Neugebauer, 548 P.2d 1032 (Okla. 1976). See also FOOTE, supra
note 2, at 817.
141. See Dickinson, The Divorce Situatiox Role of Retirement Plans, 10 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TR. J. 644 (1975).
1978]
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 14 [1978], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol14/iss1/6
